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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 10/03/2004

Accident number: 403

Accident time: 09:12

Accident Date: 05/03/2001

Where it occurred: Veli village,
municipality Berkovii,
Nr Stolac

Country: Bosnia Herzegovina

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: VMM, RB

Date of main report: 09/03/2002
Name of source: RS MAC BiH

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PROM-1 AP Bfrag

Ground condition: rocks/stones
grass/grazing area

Date record created: 06/03/2004

Date last modified: 09/03/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: GR: y=98602 x=65335 Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate area marking (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
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Accident report
What follows is the original Board of Inquiry report, edited for anonymity.

BOARD OF INQUIRY REPORT - DEMINING ACCIDENT MARCH 5th 2001 March 9th 2001.
References: RED FOLDER ID 1000367, BH STANDARD

INTRODUCTION
1.
In regard of the demining accident due to which a deminer [the Victim] got killed on
the task Velis ID 1000367 where NGO [Demining group] conducted demining. A Board of
Inquiry was convened on behalf of the BH MAC to state the circumstances of the accident.
The accident occurred March 5th 2001 in the vicinity of the Veli village, municipality Berkovii.
First phone report was received from Mr. [name excised], RS MAC operations, March 5th
2001 at 10,15 hrs, while the Initial [Demining group] Report was not delivered to MAC but
taken directly from [Demining group] facility from the site supervisor Mr. [Site Supervisor],
March 8th 2001.
2.
In relation with ID 1000367 – Veli location, [Demining group] Pale team started to
work on February 2nd 2001. They have started operations from the N/E. In the part of the
landmark toward the T2 (shown on the sketch) the task to be cleared is bordering with
previously cleared task ID 1000244, which was also cleared by [Demining group] Pale team
during February and March 2000. There was a leave within the team from February 23rd until
March 1st, when the team came to Veli and commenced operations as usual.
3.

The members of the Investigation Board were as follows:
a.
Chairman - BHMAC QA officer
b.
Member - BH MAC
c.
Member - RS MAC Inspector
d.
Member - RO F MAC Mostar Inspector

4.
The Board of Inquiry joined together March 6th 2001 at 10,30 at location Velis , ID
1000367.
SEQUENCE, DOCUMENTATION AND PROCEDURES RELATED TO THE TASK
5.
Regarding RS MAC Pale, the Velis ID 1000367 has been re-opened on March 23rd
2001 while the works started on February 2nd 2001. It is a continuation of the task that has
been closed and a new one is opened. Three sections of [Demining group] Pale team worked
on this task, including 18 deminers, three team leaders and a supervisor. The work continued
until February 23rd when the [Demining group] team got their leave. The work continued after
the leave on March 2nd.
6.
The Red folder contents and the General survey report contain a minefield record
with three rows of PMRA-2A and PROM-1. The team mentioned already found and destroyed
in situ one PROM-1 mine in the year of 2001. The conductor of works was familiar with all the
mentioned documentation.

GEOGRAPHY AND WEATHER
7.
The accident occurred on the area within the task ID 1000367, village Velis location,
municipality of Berkovii. It is an area close to the IEBL (Stolac town). Landmark grid
references were y=98580 x=65206, datum point grid references were y=98602 x=65335.
Task sketch for the grids of all the turning points is provided in Annex B.
8.
The area is rock-strewn (Herzegovina conditions), with fallen grass between stones,
including variations in the area slopes (shown at photographs in Annex C). Annex B also
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contains the sketch of the task and the place of the accident, as with conditions found by the
BH MAC BoI. [Annexes were not made available but some pictures were.]
9.
After the leave, the work continued March 2nd 2001. Weather was windy and rainy
prior to the accident, which resulted in stopping the works. On the day of the accident the
weather was bad with a very strong wind.
10.
The photographs of both the area and the site of the accident, with all the tools and
equipment found near the accident site, are attached as Annex C and were all taken by the
Board of Inquiry. There are no police photographs taken on the site.

PRIORITY OF THE TASK
11.
Setting priority for this task has been conducted using the usual procedure, i.e. from
the municipality upwards to the Entity levels. Minefield continuously stretched between the
FWF. Parts of this minefield were cleared before by both commercial organizations and
NGOs. The priority to this task was given by RS MAC with the aim for encouraging the return
of refugees and displaced persons as well as diminishing mine threat for the inhabitants of
Velis village.

TASK SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING
12.
Task site layout with all the administrative areas is set according to the BH Standard.
Access lane leading between the administrative areas and the datum line is marked with 1.2
m white tipped pickets with no tape attached (access lane through cleared / safe area). The
place in the working lane that was reached the previous day is marked with crossed 0.5m
white tipped pickets. This marking is in accordance with [Demining group] SOP but not with
the BH Standard.

[The picture shows the mined area being worked on.]

QUALITY ASSURANCE
13.
Internal quality assurance on the task was conduced through the visits of the program
manager in SOP defined time schedule (at least once in every 7 days). These visits
encompass the observations about the task, which is in accordance to the organisation’s
SOP. Programme manager was introduced with the hard working conditions on the site (both
geography and weather), but he did not recommend cutting the working hours on the site.
Internal Control documentation from the site is attached in Annex D. There are no data in this
documentation about quality control checks on the cleared areas or about programme
manager and supervisor visits to the site / lanes.
14.
RO RS MAC had conducted external quality control inspections. There are
documents proving two inspections conducted. First one occurred February 2nd 2001 when
the activities commenced and when the company was introduced with the task. Second
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inspection occurred February 7th 2001. From the documentation dated February 7th, it has
been noted down that 5 PME-2A were found, as well as 1 PMA-3 mine and 1 MTKM 60P1.
15.
It has been stated from the site diary that internal and external quality control checks
found no faults or remarks related to the compliance to the [Demining group] SOP and BH
Standard (Annex D). Metal detector check was conducted regularly (Annex D). [Photographs
showed that the detector was the Guartel MD8.]

TASKING, REPORTING AND COMMUNICATION NETWORK
16.
The task was issued to the [Demining group] demining company at their own request
for deployment of their personnel in Southern parts of RS, since the conditions for work were
much better during winter period, since the weather actually forced them to stop their task at
the area of ‘Djukisa potok ID 1000328 – Srpsko Sarajevo.
17.
Reporting was conducted according to [Demining group] SOP; communication
system was controlled and did function on the moment when the accident occurred.

MEDICAL COVERAGE
18.
First day after the leave (March 2nd 2001) a MEDEVAC exercise was conducted at
10,00 hrs. During the activities, the medic on the site was located as close as possible to
deminers in their working lanes, outside the control point, all in order to satisfy the condition
that he can reach every deminer within maximum 5 minutes (control point did not allow this
condition to be fulfilled).
19.
The accident occurred at 09,12 hrs, while the medic was at the accident location
within two minutes. The severely injured deminer was in a state of coma, with numerous
severe injuries, with practically no breathing and very weak pulse. After resuscitation was
conducted (releasing the mouth and tongue, very weak breathing, just as a result of a reflex),
the medic tried to stop bleeding, put bandages and immobilize him. All this was ineffective
since the injured deminer died at 09,28 hrs.
20.
Annex E contains the medic’s statement and the statement of the Trebinje hospital
doctor about the injuries found. [This annex was not made available.]
21.
case.

Medical coverage suited the task and could not possibly do anything more in this

PERSONNEL INVOLVED
22.
The deminer [the Victim] from [Demining group] team T-6-DS-1 Pale got killed in the
accident that occurred at Velis site ID on March 5th 2001.
23.

There were no other injured personnel.

EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS
24.
The deminer who got killed had in his working lane the following tools and equipment
(found by the board): metal detector-MD-8, prodder, grass scissors, garden shears, hammer,
base stick and a protective jacket that was found, damaged by explosion as well as a helmet
with a visor. One shrapnel broke through the visor. The Board of Inquiry found no spade
amongst the tools.
25.
The sketch in the Annex shows the exact location of each and every piece of
equipment. [Not made available.]
26.
Grass scissors and garden shears were in the working lane but there was no cutting
vegetation to 5 cm or lower (photographs at Annex C). Vegetation did not disturb the work of
the metal detector because it was mostly on the ground. During its search, the detector could
locate at even less than 5 cm above the ground.
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DETAILS ON EXPLOSIVE DEVICE INVOLVED
27.
Mine that caused the accident was a PROM-1P, of a kind with a symmetric plate,
which was found at the location of the explosion. Mine PROM-1P is a bounding fragmentation
mine, which activates when it bounds about 20 cm above the ground.
28.
Stepping on it with left foot activated mine. There was not even a crater, except for
the part where the plate was found, since the explosion threw back the stones at the place of
the bouncing. Only the powder tube is visible from the ground. Photo attached in Annex C.
29.
lane.

The mine bounded under the angle of 800 towards the cleared part of the working

30.
The mine itself was very well hidden between the stones. The same deminer worked
in the parallel lane and he would have noticed it then since the vegetation was low on the
ground.

EVIDENCE OF REMINING
31.
There is no evidence on remining since it says it the minefield record (though not very
precise one) that PROM mines were laid in rows.

CLOTHES AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
32.
Upon entering the site the deminer had his protective equipment along with the
helmet with a visor. The visor was transparent and new. The helmet and the visor were not
on the deminer’s head when the accident occurred (the Board of Inquiry found it in the
cleared part). Only one shrapnel went through the visor, while the head has several injuries
(3-4 shrapnels). The helmet and the visor had neither blood on them nor pieces of the cap the
deminer had on his head. The cap was torn with several shrapnels and soaked with blood at
the front part.
33.
The right boot was torn from the inside with one shrapnel, at the very top of the boot.
Though the Board did not see the left boot, as stated by the medic, the damages were done
mostly to the toe part and leather part above it.
34.
The protective jacket shows transparent holes at the upper chest part as well as at
the left neck protection part. Crotch protection also contains visible shrapnel holes.
(Photographs shown in Annex C).

[The picture shows some damage to the neck of the Victim’s armour apron.]

DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES ON THE DAY OF THE ACCIDENT
35.
The weather on the site was windy. As stated during internal quality control checks
conducted by the programme manager, breaks during operations were given more often due
to bad weather and complicated terrain. The deminers led by the team leader [name excised]
worked at the final location in pairs (3 deminers in working lanes, three deminers at the
control point. First group worked from 08,00 to 09,00 with 5 minutes break on the cleared
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area. There was a shift of deminers in the working lane at 09,00 hrs. As shown on the sketch,
[deminer 1], [the Victim] and [deminer 2] entered the working lanes.
36.
There was a 250 m distance from the control point to the working lane where the
accident happened. Having into consideration the weather, the hard conditions on the ground
and the distance, the deminers’ shift could not have been performed but within the time scope
of 5-7 minutes. Deminers started to work at 09,07 hrs. As to the written statement of the
medic, the accident happened at 09,12 hrs. The medic's obligations on the site are defined in
the sense of timing, which makes him more reliable person from the moment of the accident
to his arrival to the hospital. The deminer who was located closer to the datum line was out of
the working lane 'resting' when the accident happened. (09:12 hrs)
37.
The injured deminer stepped on a PROM-1P mine at about 3.60m from the beginning
of his lane, which indicates that he had 'cleared' about 4 square metres since he started to
work.
38.
The medic was on the accident spot within two minutes since he was located at the
safe area, at the approximate distance of 100 m from each of the deminers in their lanes (that
is why he was not at the control point because that would enable him to reach every deminer
within 5 minutes). The medic stated death at 09:28 . The killed deminer was transported to
the emergency hospital in Trebinje, where Dr. [name excised] prepared the death report.

[The picture shows the accident site. Photographs showing the victim’s boot and what appear
to be bits of the victim’s leg were also made available.]

DEMINER'S ACTIVITES PRIOR TO THE EXPLOSION
39.
Deminer had searched the working lane with his metal detector, having clearly
marked the reached right border of his working lane. However it is obvious that he did not
mark the left border of his working lane, i.e. he did not follow the metal detector search
progress. He most probably had in mind to additionally mark the reached or ‘searched’ area.
After searching the mentioned area with the metal detector without any signal that would
indicate the presence of metal, he went back to the beginning of his lane, left the detector
there, took two pickets, hammer and the base stick and went on marking the lane that was
supposed to be ‘searched’ by the metal detector. The first picket marking the progress in the
lane is 1.25m to the opposite one on the right side, which indicates that the base stick was not
used, since the base stick is dimensioning the length of the working lane. He took with himself
the second picket and the base stick. Prior to flushing the second stick into the ground he left
his base stick in front of him. The area he was standing on was not searched. While flushing
the second picket, the deminer stepped with his left foot on a PROM-1P mine. It is clear from
the death records and the statements of the medic (they thoroughly examined the entire
body), the deminer was in a position for flushing the 0.5m – 0.6m picket into the ground.
40.
All these assumptions were motivated by the short period of time from when his work
commenced until the moment of explosion, in comparison to the area searched. Metal
detector was supposed to locate PROM according to the [Demining group] procedure. Then
the mine was supposed to be identified by the prodder and the spade, as enough as sufficient
to identify it. Then the team leader should have been notified about it and destroy it. (The
prodder was not at the spot of the accident, but approximately 1.6m in front of it.) All the
indications show that the PROM was not found, metal detector was not used within the lane,
prodder was not close to the explosion site, and neither there was a spade in the working
lane. Bad weather and the possibility to rest when they decide may diminished the caution.
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The accident happened during marking procedure (flushing the picket in the working lane, no
tape attached from the left side of the lane).

SUMMARY
41.
The working lane where the deminer got killed was 3.60m long from its beginning
towards the place of the accident. The right side of the working lane was properly marked with
short pickets and the tape at the ground level. The tools found around the explosion spot are
shown at the sketch in Annex B with drawn distances from the explosion spot.
42.
Vegetation cutting tools were not used during the work in the lane (photographs in
Annex C).
43.
Marking of the left side of the working lane was not conducted in accordance with
either BH Standard or [Demining group] SOP. When entering the working lane, it is spotted
that the pickets were flushed at the exact distance of 1 m between them (the width of the
lane), while the next picket on the left side is flushed at the width of 1.25m between them. The
following left side picket was thrown from its original position by the explosion for about 2.1m
into the contaminated part of the lane. The accident happened during the marking procedure
of the working lane. The tape on the left side of the working lane is not damaged by shrapnels
and it is probable that it was not in the lane when the explosion occurred.
44.
In the very moment of the explosion, the killed deminer was holding in his hands the
hammer and the picket and was positioned to flush the picket into the ground. This conclusion
was extracted from the position of the body after the accident, the place of the picket, base
stick, thrown picket and the analyses of the injuries.
45.
Mine was activated by pressing the left foot on the PROM-1P mine fuse. The mine
activated just above the ground level. The position of the leg torn by the explosion indicates
that the mine exploded right behind the left leg (left boot damaged). The body was in the
position for flushing the pickets into the ground (left hand holding the picket – 2nd and 3rd
finger of the left hand amputated, while the hammer was in his right hand), which is indicated
by the reports of both the medic and the doctor at the emergency hospital in Trebinje. In the
moment of explosion, the base stick was placed in front of the deminer (in front of the mine
that exploded – while the mine remained in the cleared area) at probably at the left leg boot.
The location of where the base stick parts were found as well as the leg torn by the explosion
stands for this fact.
46.
All these facts indicate that the deminer was in front of the mine with both his feet and
that the mine was skipped.
47.
The time deminers spent working in his lane and the operations he was supposed to
conduct according to the [Demining group] SOP indicate that the deminer was not working in
compliance to the [Demining group] SOP procedures for work in the working lane.

CONCLUSION
48.
The killed deminer did not comply to the procedures of searching the working lane
with the detector and locating the given signal using his prodder and the spade. Metal
detector is damaged (a shrapnel over the detector’s hallo head), but it was operational. It
could have been quite efficiently used at this site. Provided it had passed over the mine with
the halo head, it would have surely signalled the presence of the metal.
49.
This all stands for the fact that the PROM was not located and the detector was not
used in the working lane. There is no prodder nearby the accident site or a spade in the
working lane (there is not a single deminer who would locate a PROM and leave it be for 20
seconds, forget it and then step on it.) Bad weather, possibility of taking breaks more than
usual could have diminished the caution of deminers in the lanes.
50.
The marking procedures were not conducted in compliance to the procedures of
neither the [Demining group] SOP nor BH Standard. The marking is to be conducted during
the search; it is not supposed to be conducted after the search. Provided the marking was
conducted according to the procedure, the picket in the working lane could not have been
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1.25m from the opposite one, since the base stick is the measure for the width of the lane and
placing pickets. If the base stick was used, deminer would not have left it in the unclear area
for flushing the picket into the unclear area.
51.
In such conditions, having in mind the difficult terrain (huge rocky obstacles, slopes),
bad weather, (strong wind), it is not efficient letting deminers rest as they wish in the cleared
area instead of the area designated and marked for resting. It is not appropriate not to cut the
working shift for the deminer but persistently leave him in the lane for entire hour.
52.
If the team leader could see the deminer, he would have probably stopped the way
he worked. He was supposed to organise his activities and location in order to have all his
deminers on sight.

RECOMMENDATIONS
53.
It is very often that the breach of procedures leads into an accident. Metal detector
should be used in two sweeps over the ground without touching it, progressing for the half of
the halo head.
54.
Working lane marking is to be conducting during the searching procedures. The base
stick is the border between the searched and unsafe area and is to be moved forward onto
the area that is searched in accordance with the procedures. After two metres of search, short
picket is flushed inside the searched area (the overlap).
55.
Demining procedures are monotonous. It is very hard to keep a deminer concentrated
for an entire hour without a break. At such hard areas and under such hard weather
conditions it is not possible to either concentrate for an hour, let alone rest or move without
the order given by the team leader.
56.
(The rest upon deminer’s decision). Five minutes break indicates that the time a
deminer is spending in his working lane or operational part of the site should be shorter. The
team’s leadership allowed such way of conduct without cutting the time a deminer spends
within the lane or the operational part of the site. [Demining group] is to comply with BH
Standard request for the maximum of 30 minutes of work per deminer in the working lane
(even less if necessary) and ensure each deminer a rest at the control point or area
designated for rest.
57.
This team has a supervisor and three team leaders regarding its managerial
personnel. The BoI think that it is necessary to divide the operational and the supervision
function over this team.
58.
It is necessary to re-train the team regarding the basic procedure in the working lane,
especially at area similar to the one where this task was conducted.
59.
The access lane marking and the points of progress within the working lane are to be
marked in compliance to the BH Standard.

Annexes: [Not made available.]
A
- Board of Inquiry convened
B
-Sketch of the site and the location of the accident
C
-Photographs
D
-Quality control reports
E
-Medical reports
F
-Initial report on the accident
G
-Statements of the team members

Signed: all members of the Board of Inquiry
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Victim Report
Victim number: 520

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: frontal apron

Helmet
Short visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Genitals
severe Chest
severe Head
severe Neck
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Fingers
Leg
FATAL
COMMENT
No medical report was made available. The victim died 16 minutes after the accident.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the
investigators determined that the victim was working without wearing helmet and visor,
breaching procedural and marking SOPs, and working far too quickly to be thorough. The
field supervisors were not able to check on the deminers regularly and presumably the victim
knew this, so chose not to use his metal detector and not to wear his helmet and visor as he
marked the ground.
The secondary cause is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy” because the group’s
SOPs did not match the MAC’s requirements, and also because senior managers must have
decided what was an appropriate level of field supervision and training to apply.
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